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Power systems are undergoing a profound transformation towards cy-
ber-physical systems. Disruptive changes due to energy system tran-
sition and the complexity of the interconnected systems expose the 
power system to new, unknown, and unpredictable risks. To identify 
the critical points, a vulnerability assessment was conducted, involv-
ing experts from the power as well as the information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) sectors. Weaknesses were identified, e. g., the 
lack of policy enforcement, which are worsened by the unreadiness of 
the actors involved. Due to the complex dynamics of ICT, it is infeasible 
to keep a complete inventory of potential stressors to define appropri-
ate preparation and prevention mechanisms. Therefore, we suggest ap-
plying a resilience management approach to increase the resilience of 
the system. It aims at better riding through failures rather than build-
ing higher walls. We conclude that building resilience in cyber-physical 
power systems is feasible and helps in preparing for the unexpected.
Die Gestaltung resilienter cyber-physischer Energiesysteme
Ein Ansatz basierend auf Vulnerabilitätsanalyse und Resilienz-
management
Energiesysteme befinden sich in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel hin zu cy-
ber-physischen Systemen. Disruptive Veränderungen, die von der Trans-
formation des Energiesystems und der Komplexität der miteinander 
verbundenen Systeme herrühren, setzen das Stromnetz neuen, unbe-
kannten Risiken aus. Mit einer Vulnerabilitätsanalyse unter Einbezie-
hung von Experten aus den Bereichen Energie und Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) wurden Schwachstellen identifi-
ziert, z. B. Nachteile durch die fehlende Durchsetzung von Regulierungen, 
und eine mangelnde Anpassungsbereitschaft der beteiligten Akteure. 
Die komplexe IKT-Dynamik macht es unmöglich, potenzielle Stressoren 
vollständig zu erfassen, um geeignete Präventionsmechanismen zu 
definieren. Die vorgeschlagenen Resilienzmanagementmaßnahmen zie-
len darauf ab, Krisen besser zu bewältigen, anstatt auf höhere Barrieren 
zu setzen. Die Resilienz cyber-physikalischer Energiesysteme ist möglich.
Keywords: cyber-physical power systems, resilience management, 
vulnerability assessment
Introduction
Power systems are evolving through an extended convergence 
with information and communication technologies (ICT), lead-
ing to complex cyber-physical power systems (CPPS). This has 
brought opportunities to enhance the systems’ performance and 
provide solutions to cope with the associated challenges of en-
ergy supply based on distributed and fluctuating renewable ener-
gies. However, cyber-attacks targeting power systems have been 
growing in number and sophistication in recent years. For in-
stance, the attacks against the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 
2016 that resulted in power outages (Dragos Inc. 2017). Another 
incident against a utility in the United States was reported on 
March 2019 (Sobzak 2019). Several risk and vulnerability assess-
ments for power systems have been published in recent years (e. g. 
NIST 2014; Rossebo et al. 2017). In these studies, potential im-
pacts and mitigation options were evaluated based on lists of po-
tential threats and their likelihood of occurrence. We argue that 
due to the dynamic nature of ICT and its complex interdepend-
ency with the power infrastructure, we have to expect surprises. 
It will no longer be possible to identify a comprehensive inven-
tory of potential threats, as is the case in classic risk management.
A reliable power supply is of great importance for almost all 
areas of life, therefore it is necessary to develop strategies that 
enable the power system to be prepared for expected and unex-
pected stressors. In other words, it is essential to apply a resil-
ience management strategy. Many definitions of resilience ex-
ist in the scientific community (e. g. Jesse et al. 2019). For this 
study, we describe resilience as a (socio-technical) system’s 
ability to maintain its services under stress and in turbulent 
conditions (Brand et al. 2017; Gleich et al. 2010). The advan-
tage of using this definition is that it focusses on the system ser-
vices, which must be outlined together with the stakeholders/us-
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ers. In this way, changes and evolutions of the system are possi-
ble, which are core aspects of transitions. The focus lies on the 
complex nature of interconnectedness and interdependency, and 
the capability of the system to maintain its services.
This article presents the results of an empirical and interdis-
ciplinary base study that involved actors from energy and ICT 
sectors through interviews and workshops, to get better insights 
into the vulnerabilities of CPPS. The study consists of two parts. 
First, a vulnerability assessment (VA) was performed to iden-
tify critical points coming from the ICT infrastructure. Second, 
a resilience strategy was developed by using a resilience man-
agement approach to identify how CPPS can be better prepared 
for any stressor.
Methodology
Vulnerability Assessment Approach
The event-based and structural VA methods (Fig. 1) carried out 
in Gleich et  al. (2010) and Gößling-Reisemann et  al. (2013) 
were used as reference for this study.
The potential impacts were evaluated based on their effect on 
the system services, which were defined in this case according 
to parameters for both the electric and ICT infrastructures. Re-
garding the electric infrastructure, the quantity criteria are de-
termined by the system’s ability to supply the connected load. 
The quality criteria are defined by direct technical parameters, 
such as power quality or reliability indices, and by indirect pa-
rameters, such as socio-economic and socioecological impacts. 
Regarding the ICT infrastructure, the approach considers the ef-
fect on the security requirements, i. e. confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and non-repudiation of data in transit or at rest (e. g. 
control commands, firmware, software, etc.).
The study focused on the German and European power sys-
tem covering the complete electrical energy conversion chain 
and was limited to evaluate stressors from the ICT infrastructure. 
The component layer of the Smart Grid Architecture Model1 was 
used as a reference architecture model. Two workshops and 19 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts from 
the sectors: energy, industrial automation, ICT, and public bod-
ies in the period between June 2016 to March 2017. The expert 
statements were evaluated by means of a comprehensive quali-
tative content analysis methodology based on Mayring (2014).
Combining the experts’ opinions, relevant literature, and our 
own judgement, the potential impacts were qualitatively rated 
as high, medium or low according to the effects of stressors and 
structural weaknesses on the quality and quantity criteria of the 
system services. In order to determine the adaptive capacity, in-
puts from experts and literature were considered regarding ex-
isting or foreseen adaptation mechanisms and the readiness of 
the concerned actors to implement them. They were also qualita-
1   http://smartgridstandardsmap.com/
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Fig. 1: Schematic representation of the VA methodology. Left: Event-based VA. Right: Structural VA.  
  Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Gleich et al. (2010) and Gößling-Reisemann et al. (2013)
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Fig. 2: Vulnerability assessment matrix that considers the level of potential 
 impacts on system services and adaptive capacity. (H: High, M: Medium, L: Low). 
 Source: Authors’ own compilation based on 
  Gleich et al. (2010) and Gößling-Reisemann et al. (2013)
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tively rated as high, medium or low. Con-
sequently, the vulnerability level was the 
result of combining potential impacts and 
adaptive capacity according to the matrix 
showed in Fig.  2. A more detailed de-
scription on the VA methodology can be 
found in Tapia et al. (in press)
Resilience Management Approach
Resilient CPPS should have a diverse set 
of capabilities such as resistance/robust-
ness, adaptation, innovation and improv-
isation to overcome known and unknown 
stressors. They help the systems to main-
tain their system services (see definition 
above). In this study, the resilience man-
agement approach described in Acatech 
et  al. (2017) and Goessling-Reisemann 
and Thier (2019) was used as reference. It 
comprises a four-phase approach: (1) Pre-
pare and prevent, (2) Implement robust 
and precautionary design, (3) Manage 
and recover from crises, and (4) Learn for the future. The sug-
gested measures for each step were developed based on the VA 
results, the resilience design principles/elements described in 
Brand et al. (2017) and Goessling-Reisemann and Thier (2019), 
the statements of the interviewed experts, and our own judg-
ments (Fig. 3).
Vulnerability Assessment Results
The VA identified critical properties, structures and elements 
contributing to the vulnerability of the CPPS. Based on the qual-
itative content analysis results, the findings were sorted into the 
following four categories: (a) technology, (b) organizational se-
curity policies and procedures, (c) the human factor, and (d) reg-
ulations. Each category included subcategories and they were as-
sessed individually using the VA methodology described above. 
All subcategories resulted in high vulnerability ratings following 
the combination of medium to high potential impacts with me-
dium or low adaptive capacities (Tab. 1). The list of categories 
and subcategories is not intended to be comprehensive. However, 
it reflects the fact that the interviewees were queried about what 
the critical points are according to their opinion, which led to a 
list of high vulnerabilities. In the following section, the findings 
for each category will briefly be described.
Technology
The increased number of systems, endpoints and actors involved 
in the CPPS leads to a higher number of interconnections and 
communications. If these communications use unencrypted or 
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Fig. 3: Four phases of the resilient management approach scheme and the sources for determining 
the suggested measures for each phase.  Source: Authors’ own compilation based on 
  Acatech et al. (2017) and Goessling-Reisemann and Thier (2019)
Category Subcategory Potential 
 Impacts
Adaptive 
 Capacity
Vulner­
ability
Technology Insecure endpoints M–H M H
Insecure communications M–H M H
Organizational security policies and procedures Improper patch management M–H M H
Lack of interdisciplinary IT-OT knowledge M–H M H
The human factor Lack of security awareness in organizations M–H M H
Lack of security awareness among consumers M–H L H
Regulations Lack of effective implementation of standards and regulations M–H M H
Lack of coordinated effort to improve security M–H M H
Tab. 1: Categories and subcategories that reflect critical properties, structures and elements of CPPS and the corresponding ratings of Potential Impacts, 
Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability on the scale L: Low, M: Medium, H: High.  Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Tapia et al. (in press)
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weakly encrypted network protocols, authentication keys and 
data payload are exposed (NIST 2014). Using Man-in-the-Mid-
dle attacks, threat agents will be able to listen, inject or manipu-
late messages between nodes. From one side, legacy communi-
cation protocols used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) in the 
generation, transmission and distribution domains have evolved 
from proprietary point-to-point links and isolated from external 
networks to open and standard protocols. According to the ex-
perts, this represents a high security problem. The ‘Crashover-
ride’ malware, which seems to have been used in the Ukraine 
blackout in 2016, is a good illustration of an advanced malware 
that leverages the weaknesses of certain ICS protocols (Dra-
gos Inc. 2017).
From the other side, experts also stated that the more distrib-
uted and closer to the end-consumer the communication occurs, 
the more vulnerable it gets. The reason is that devices located at 
the customer premises (e. g. Internet-of-Things devices) are de-
ployed with poor security features and furthermore, they are not 
regulated. In most of the cases, they do not have capabilities for 
secure key management, control access, or patch management. 
Security challenges and threats of smart home devices are dis-
cussed in Lee et al. (2014).
Organizational Security Policies and Procedures
Experts agreed that due to the increasing complexity and inter-
dependencies between IT and Operation Technology (OT) infra-
structures, the knowledge needed to address the new challenges 
has changed. In most of the cases, interdisciplinary knowledge 
is missing or limited, and therefore it is difficult to properly un-
derstand, design, implement and operate the complete complex 
system. Normally, OT assets are maintained by ICS operators 
and engineers rather than experienced IT professionals, which 
can result in common mistakes in maintenance, configuration, 
and lack of hardening (Bodungen et al. 2017). Moreover, typi-
cal IT systems security measures cannot be directly applied in 
ICS environments, because the process stability or availabil-
ity could be affected. Therefore, specific and tailored security 
measures are needed.
As experts stated, ICS usually tend to be outdated, either be-
cause vendors do not provide security patches or because the 
particular system is time-critical. As a consequence, attackers 
are able to gain access to different system components by ex-
ploiting known security-gaps that have not yet been patched. 
Nevertheless, even if all patches and mitigations are kept up-to-
date, attacks are becoming more sophisticated and adversaries 
use unknown zero-day exploits (McLaughlin et al. 2015), i. e. 
attacks based on previously unidentified and unpatched cyber- 
security gaps.
The Human Factor
The lack of effective security trainings and awareness programs 
in power sector organizations can lead to insufficiently trained 
or engaged personnel in cyber-security aspects (NIST 2014). 
Applying social engineering, threat agents are exploring new at-
tack mechanisms targeting different levels in the organization. 
This is one of the fastest growing security problems according 
to the experts. In the Ukrainian blackout in 2015, attackers de-
veloped the Blackenergy 3 tool malware and performed a phish-
ing campaign targeting employees from the electricity distribu-
tor (Styzcynski and Beach-Westmoreland 2019).
Disgruntled employees, or ex-employees, who are not prop-
erly managed when leaving the company, may represent further 
potential threat actors. They could have detailed knowledge of 
the systems and access to critical data, allowing them to identify 
weak internal structures and methods to compromise the sys-
tems. Furthermore, critical information about the system con-
figuration could be even publicly available through vendors’ or 
asset owners’ websites, employees’ social media sites, or from 
other sources. Attackers can leverage this information for plan-
ning the attack.
Additionally, experts mentioned also that end users repre-
sent another vulnerable point because of their lack of aware-
ness or understanding of the consequences of eventually low 
security of their smart devices. A more complex problem de-
rives from end-users being prosumers, who may not have the 
expert-knowledge to implement and maintain appropriate secu-
rity measures for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) systems 
(e. g. smart inverters).
Regulations
The lack of an effective implementation of security standards 
and regulations represents another critical point for CPPS. Ex-
perts considered that the absence of mandatory regulations to 
enforce power system operators to implement minimum re-
quired security standards, or vendors to provide the necessary 
security requirements in their products expose the system to pos-
sible cyber-attacks, for instance man-in-the-middle attacks on 
non-upgraded ICS systems running the IEC 60 870-5 protocol 
(Maynard et al. 2014).
Different technical and organizational standards have been 
developed to address cyber-security requirements in smart grids 
(ENISA 2012; NIST 2014). Nevertheless, as experts stated, in 
most of the cases, these are only recommendations and the com-
pliance to a minimum-security level is not enforced by regu-
lations. Furthermore, the experts mentioned that there are no 
economic incentives for grid operators to invest in cyber-secu-
rity enhancements. The decision to upgrade legacy ICS in or-
der to implement the security measures could be delayed until 
the next planned lifecycle equipment replacement, not only be-
cause of the processes’ criticality, but due to the additional as-
sociated costs. Another critical point, as experts remarked, is 
the missing effective coordination to improve security for the 
overall system.
The critical points discussed in this section are related to all 
categories mentioned above. The relationship is seen as lack of 
readiness of the involved actors to implement existing adapta-
tion strategies. Thus, increasing the vulnerability level of each 
category itself.
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Resilience management strategy
The VA unveiled the critical vulnerable points. Security meas-
ures, if applied, have great potential to reduce some vulnerabili-
ties. However, they focus mainly on trying to keep the malicious 
attackers outside of the system. Therefore, one of the biggest 
challenges is to find a way to broaden the horizon in handling 
known and unknown stressors by including recovering, adapt-
ing and learning mechanism after successful attacks, instead of 
only focusing on prevention and detection. This is the objective 
of the second part of the study. Our main concern is how to in-
crease the resilience in CPPS. This requires the understanding 
that resilience is more than just eliminating identified vulnera-
bilities. The applied resilience management approach consists 
of four phases (Fig. 3).
During the preparation and prevention phase, weak points 
in the CPPS are identified and effective prevention measures 
must be derived. The focus here is on known stressors, thus a 
holistic security approach between IT-OT (IEC 2016), and en-
ergy-focused risk analysis and management strategies (Fischer 
et al. 2018) are needed. Experts also stressed the importance 
of scalable and regularly tested security measures at endpoints 
(e. g. encryption, authentication, authorization), intrusion detec-
tion systems, patch management, network segmentation, as well 
as more effective and engaging security trainings and awareness 
programs. Technology-wise, the implementation of additional 
measures for data storage and preserving of unused resources – 
operational slack – to better deal with surprises are helpful (Fis-
cher and Lehnhoff 2018).
In order to enhance resilience, a robust and precaution-
ary system design should be implemented from the begin-
ning. This will empower the system to maintain its services even 
under stress or disturbances. The system should have a high di-
versity of IT components and redundancy in communication 
channels and devices (BNetzA 2019). Maintaining the ability to 
rely only on physical parameters for operation as well as hard-
ware-based security are helpful. Furthermore, implementing a 
cellular structure in order to secure a minimum and stable power 
supply in case of a failing central ICT infrastructure appears 
beneficial (VDE 2015). Other suggestions supported by the ex-
perts are the implementation of real-time monitoring, intrusion 
and bad data detection schemes (Iturbe et al. 2016; McCarthy 
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  Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Tapia et al. (in press)
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et al. 2018), as well as periodic backups, and reducing services 
and functionalities in terms of data, ports, libraries, etc. (Fischer 
and Lehnhoff 2018).
A resilient power system is able to ride through failures in 
order to manage and recover from crises. While the stabil-
ity and security in this phase could be enhanced by multi-agent 
based control with decentral consensus finding (Lehnhoff and 
Krause 2013), attention should also be paid to the ability to op-
erate the system without ICT, i. e. manually, or to at least se-
cure a soft landing, as experts stated. In addition, the provision 
of business continuity and emergency plans on a regional and 
local level, e. g. through supplying islands at least in and around 
public properties/buildings, and the preparation for active emer-
gency planning and exercises based on realistic cyber-attacks 
have a high priority (Arghandeh et al. 2016).
Past and avoided disasters should be used in phase four to 
learn for the future in order to improve the adaptive capacity of 
the system. In this sense, digital forensic would allow to inves-
tigate incidents and near incidents in-depth and identify lessons. 
This should include the documentation of weaknesses that led 
to failures (Vulnerability store) (Gößling-Reisemann 2016). Fur-
thermore, strengths that avoided crises in the past or enhanced 
recovery are equally worth identifying, as they form the basis 
for planning strategies and emergency scenarios (Solution store) 
(Gößling-Reisemann 2016). This documentation must be man-
datory and publicly available.
Fig. 4 shows the summary of selected resilience-enhancing 
measures and elements for each phase of the resilience manage-
ment approach. More details on the specific resilience manage-
ment strategy described here can be found in Tapia et al. (in press).
Conclusions
In this study, critical properties, structures and elements contrib-
uting to the vulnerability of CPPS were identified. On one side, 
insecure communications or insecure end points, especially at 
the customer premises, resulted in a high vulnerability due to 
poor security features on the devices. On the other side, social 
engineering is a quickly growing security problem that enables 
threat agents to exploit one of the weaknesses present in every 
organization: the human factor. In spite of the existence of adap-
tation mechanisms that could minimize the impact, it was found 
that their implementation could be hindered by the lack of pol-
icy enforcement or the unreadiness of the involved actors to im-
plement these measures. To address cybersecurity challenges, 
an integrated assessment considering physical, cyber and social 
perspectives is necessary. The aim is not only to try to keep at-
tackers outside the system, but to design the system in a way that 
enables it to transform and adapt in order to cope with any kind 
of stressor. In other words, a resilience management strategy is 
needed that considers that resilience is more than just eliminat-
ing identified vulnerabilities. This article illustrated resilience 
enhancing measures assigned to the four phases of the resil-
ience management cycle. One important measure is to establish 
an adequate cyber security regulation framework and monitor 
its effective implementation. Regarding the system architecture, 
a cellular structure and physical backup would build resilience 
in case of successful attacks. We conclude that introducing re-
silience principles/elements to the system and using a resilience 
management approach is a suitable way to prepare systems for 
the unexpected.
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